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Abstract: A driving force behind the emergence of the ‘new’ or information 
economy is the growth of the internet network capacity. A fundamental 
problem in mapping this dynamic is the lack of an acceptable theoretical 
framework through which to direct empirical investigations. Most of the 
models in the literature on network externalities have been developed in a static 
framework, with the externalities viewed as instantaneous or self-fulfilling.  
The model specified here builds on the received theory from several sources  
to extend these features and develops a dynamic model that is both capable  
of econometric estimation and which provides as an output a direct measure of 
the network effect. Accordingly, the main goal of this paper is to find the 
magnitude of the external effect on internet network growth. In addition, this 
paper illustrates the ability of the panel data to generate estimates of structural 
parameters capable of explaining internet host growth. 
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1 Introduction 
The internet is a distribution system or conduit through which content is sent. Traditional 
telecommunications systems are specialised in that they (essentially) carry only two-way 
simultaneous voice messages along dedicated circuit-switched paths and they are not 
easily modified to do much else (Economides and White, 1994). What is different (and 
unique) about the internet network is that it is both two-way broadband and interactive. 
Just about any electronic signal can be sent, more or less, from anybody to anybody  
else (Faulhaber, 1999). Another distinguishing feature of internet traffic is that it is 
packet-switched, i.e., no continuous path is devoted to the delivery of a message. 
Recent internet network growth has created new and expanded existing markets for 
broadband (bandwidth) capacity to carry two-way interactive high-speed data transfers. 
Accordingly, the internet has the potential to increase productivity growth and generate 
wealth in a variety of distinct but mutually reinforcing ways (Litan and Rivlin, 2001). 
Given this potential, a recent OECD (2000) finding that indicates that the European 
Union (EU) is lagging behind the USA in terms of internet penetration is important. That 
study shows, e.g., that in March 2000, there were 185 internet hosts per 1000 inhabitants 
in the USA compared to 41 per 1000 in the UK and 16 per 1000 in France. Further, it  
is suggested that internet access pricing structures may be a key factor in explaining 
penetration (Bourreau, 2001; Rappoport et al., 2002). A fairly natural question then for 
economists to consider is whether the differential rates of internet system growth is due to 
internet access pricing structures or, more fundamentally, growth generated by direct 
network externalities after a critical system mass is achieved. 
Direct network externalities occur when the utility of a consumer depends directly on 
the total number of compatible services (Gandal, 1995). Such direct network externalities 
have long been recognised in models explaining optimal telecommunications network 
size (Katz and Shapiro, 1986).1 In this context subscribers’ utility depends on the number 
of subscribers with compatible access (Economides, 1996). Rohlfs (1974) formulated  
the first model of the equilibrium number of telephone handsets in a population by 
focusing on individual constrained choice for telephone subscription incorporating 
parameters for consumer income and price. The equilibrium user set is the subscriber 
base resulting from the combined outcome of individual utility maximisation 
programmes. Multiple equilibriums may exist, with a small network making potential 
subscription relatively unattractive. 
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Economides and Himmelberg (1995) refine the notion of critical mass as the smallest 
size network that can be sustained in equilibrium. They argue that when the critical mass 
is substantial, market coverage will not be achieved – either the market does not exist or 
it is of insufficient coverage.2 Accordingly, consumer willingness to adopt internet 
service is an increasing function of network size (Shy, 2001). The existence of network 
externalities in a dynamic setting increases the speed at which market demand grows  
in the presence of a downward trend for industry marginal cost. Given the possible 
existence of a network externality for internet connection (and e-commerce), estimates of 
the size of the network effect are critical for forecasting demand and in network planning. 
Accordingly, a model is developed here to describe the global internet market growth that 
provides a detailed analysis of the nature of the externality. 
Bensaid and Lesne (1996) argue that most network externality models are developed 
in a static framework, with externalities viewed as either instantaneous or self-fulfilling. 
An Economides (1996) dynamic ‘macro’ approach is employed here to analyse the role 
network externalities have in explaining internet system growth in a continuous-time 
setting. The ‘macro’ approach simply assumes network externalities exist and attempts to 
model their consequences.3 Further, here the notion of network externality is broadened 
to include those due to producer activity. Interaction between agents’ (consumers’ and 
firms’) decisions is considered by a representative agent model in which sustained growth 
is the result of positive externalities from investment in network input n. Agents are 
linked through income flows and endogenous growth in the internet network occurs 
through the inclusion of a network externality in the production argument in the ‘old 
economy’ firms’ production function and also in the consumer’s instantaneous utility 
function. The system is stochastic because the return to the representative consumer from 
Applications Sector (AS) investment is uncertain. The stochastic income specification 
leads to a stochastic inter-temporal optimisation problem. The resultant solution provides 
an optimised network growth equation for estimation. The model is estimated on  
cross-country panel data to yield a direct measure of the strength of the network effect. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 specifies a model to examine internet 
network growth that incorporates a network externality. In Section 3 data and variables 
used in estimation are presented and described. The empirical modelling strategy is 
explained in Section 4, and estimates of network externalities are reported. Concluding 
remarks and policy implications are provided in Section 5. 
2 A dynamic model of internet network growth 
Consider a decentralised economy that consists of a representative household, and a 
representative old economy firm that behaves competitively. The firm controls both 
network and non-network input levels. A positive externality is associated with network 
investment through production activity. Internet network externalities can also arise 
through consumption. A representative consumer obtains utility from real total 
consumption and its current network size. The consumer has the option not to consume 
all her income. Non-consumption (or saving) defaults to network investment. The 
consumer can, moreover, elect to relinquish ownership of part of the network in exchange 
for ownership of an AS investment that provides a risky return. 
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2.1 Network production externalities 
Let F(v,n,n*) denote the production function of a representative firm where v is either  
an aggregate non-network input or a vector of non-network inputs, e.g., labour and  
non-network capital. Let n* represent a network externality generated through productive 
activity. This argument allows ‘endogenous growth’ to occur in the network growth 
equation, viz., the production function exhibits decreasing returns in n (from the 
perspective of the firm) and increasing returns when n is equated to n* post-optimisation. 
That is, during optimisation n* is treated by the firm as exogenous, and post-optimisation 
n* is equated to n when model equations are derived. Thus positive externalities arise 
from network capital and are a source of increasing returns in production. Let w represent 
the price of variable inputs. Illustration of the ‘optimising out’ process is provided for the 
case where v is a variable input. Consider the production function: 
1( , , *) (1 *)F v n n v n nα α β−= +  (1) 
and the instantaneous variable profit function (conditional on network size, n): 
( , , *) max ( , , *) .vw n n F v n n wvΠ = 〈 − 〉  (2) 
The solution for optimal v is: 
1/(1 ) 1 /(1 ) /(1 )ˆ (1 *)v w n nα α β αα − − − −= +  (3) 
where the linearity of vˆ  in n follows from the linear homogeneity of the production 
function in (v,n). 
Conditional on the n, optimised output can then be constructed as a function of  
input prices: 
/(1 ) /(1 ) /(1 )ˆ ( , , *) (1 *) .F w n n w n nα α α α β αα − − − −= +  (4) 
Further, the linearity of optimised output in n, i.e., from the point of view of the firm’s 
optimisation, without internalising the externality, is emphasised by writing: 
ˆ ( , , *) ( , *)F w n n R w n n=  (5) 
where R(w,n*) is the return per unit of network capital: 
/(1 ) /(1 ) /(1 )( , *) (1 *) .R w n w nα α α α β αα − − − −= +  (6) 
∂R(w,n*)/∂n* > 0 indicates the production network externality directly augments the 
return per unit of network capital or interest rate in this stylised model. 
2.2 Network consumption externalities 
Internet network externalities can also arise through consumption. Let U(c,n*) denote  
the instantaneous utility function of a representative consumer where c is real total 
consumption and n* is the current network size for an average firm (which is outside  
the control of the consumer). The point of departure here is the standard iso-elastic  
utility specification that emphasises the importance of the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution (IES = –∂lnc/∂lnUc). Temporarily setting aside the network effect, specify 
instantaneous utility iso-elastic: 
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( , ) .U c cγ=i  (7) 
The IES for (7) is: 
1 /(1 ),IES γ= −  (8) 
where –∞ < γ < 1. The IES indicates the willingness of a consumer to forego current 
consumption in favour of current saving and greater discounted future utility, viz., 
consumer flexibility. Here the network consumption externality is introduced through  
the IES, i.e., as income is received from n* and as consumer flexibility might realistically 
be income dependent, it seems reasonable to suspect the IES is affected by n*. The 
specification adopted here is: 
1 2
1 *
.
1 * 1 *
n
IES
n n
θ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (9) 
In Equation (9) the IES ranges in value from θ 1 when there is no network rollout (n* = 0) 
and asymptotes to θ 2 as the network expands indefinitely (n* → ∞). The IES is 
increasing in n* if θ 2 > θ 1, viz., the consumer becomes more flexible. Accordingly, the 
utility function incorporating network externality effects is written as a function of 
network size G(n*): 
( *)( , *) G nU c n c=  (10) 
where since IES = 1/[1–G(n*)] or G(n*) = 1–1/IES, and with the IES given by (9), G(n*) 
is specified: 
1 2
1
( *) 1 .
1 *
1 * 1 *
G n
n
n n
θ θ
= − ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (11) 
2.3 Income flows 
The old economy firm produced output through Equation (5). This output is a source of 
income to the owners of the firm – the consumers. Income is also derived from a 
stochastic return to consumers from AS (new economy) investment obtained by selling x 
of the network n. In doing so the consumer foregoes a ‘sure’ rate of return R(w,n*)xdt for 
receipt of risky return xdq/q. While uncertainty of income flow is expected for both new 
and old economy firms – it seems reasonable to assume that new economy firm returns 
are the more uncertain. To focus attention, uncertainty is isolated to the returns of the 
new economy firm. Here the risky asset is assumed to pay no dividend and provide only a 
capital gain or loss. The resulting flow of consumer income from production and 
investment sources is: 
( , *) [ / ( , *) ]dy R w n ndt dq q R w n dt x= + −  (12) 
where the price of the risky asset, q, is modelled as following a geometric Brownian 
motion with drift µq and volatility σq: 
q q qdq qdt qdzµ σ= +  (13) 
and dzq is Brownian motion, with the properties E(dzq) = 0, E(dzq)2 = dt.4 
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2.4 Expenditure 
An alternative to consumption is the retention of earnings by the firm, which are 
employed to extend the network. Consequently, network expansion is stochastic and so 
the demand side of the income identity is: 
,dy cdt pdn= +  (14) 
where the network access price p converts the value of the network extension into units 
of the consumption good. 
2.5 Optimisation model 
For the stochastic income specification Equation (12) through Equation (14), the 
representative consumer’s inter-temporal optimisation problem is: 
0 0 0 { ( ), ( )} 0
0
( , , ) max ( ( ), * ( ))tc t x tJ n p w E e U c t n t dt
δ
∞
−= ∫  (15) 
subject to: 
( , *) / ( , *)R w n n c dq q R w n dt
dn dt x
p p
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −= +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (16) 
q q qdq qdt qdzµ σ= +  (17) 
p p pdp pdt pdzµ σ= +  (18) 
w w wdw wdt wdzµ σ= +  (19) 
* ( ) ( ), [0, )n t n t t= ∈ ∞  (20) 
0 0 0(0) , (0) , (0) .n n p p w w= = =  (21) 
2.6 Optimised network growth equation 
Combining Equation (16) and Equation (17) the network growth equation can be 
characterised as a diffusion of the form: 
( , *) [ ( , *)]
.q q q
R w n n R w n x c x
dn dt dz
p p
µ σ+ − −⎧ ⎫= +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭  (22) 
Due to the time-autonomous nature of Equation (15), the solutions for c and x may be 
obtained in feedback or synthesised form, expressing the controls as a function of the 
current values of the states of n, p and w. To describe the solution, it is useful to define 
the latent variables: 
( , *)r R w n=  (23) 
and 
1/[1 ( *)],h G n= −  (24) 
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interpretable as the interest rate and the IES, respectively. Also note that n = n* in the 
optimised model.5 Further, Cooper et al. (1995) show optimal c can be written: 
2 21ˆ [1 ] ( ) /
2 q q
c h h r h r nδ µ σ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  (25) 
and optimal x as: 
2
ˆ .q
q
r
x h n
µ
σ
⎡ ⎤−= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (26) 
Utilising the synthesised solutions Equation (25) and Equation (26), and substituting into 
(22), provides the optimal network diffusion: 
2 21 [ 1]( ) /
2 q q q
q
q
r h r r
dn h ndt h ndz
p p
δ µ σ µ
σ
⎧ ⎫− + + − ⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪= +⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪ ⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭
 (27) 
where, in view of the specifications of technology and preferences, and setting n = n*: 
/(1 ) /(1 ) /(1 )[1 ]r w nα α α α β αα − − − −= +  (28) 
and 
1 2
1
.
1 1
n
h
n n
θ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (29) 
3 Data and variables 
Equation (27), after substitution of Equation (28) and Equation (29), is estimated on  
a sample of 23 OECD countries.6 Annual data from 1995 through 2000 are collected  
for Consumer Price Index (CPI), exchange rates, GDP (gross domestic product),  
internet access price, internet hosts and wages. CPI, GDP and internet host numbers 
(HOST) are obtained from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World 
Telecommunication Development Report.7 Internet access price data (PRICE) are from 
the OECD Communications Outlook 1997, 1999 and 2001. PRICE is the price of internet 
access for 20 hours per month peak rate in US Dollars (USD) purchasing power parity. 
The price of internet access is comprised of the timed public switched telephone network 
charge and monthly internet service provider fee. Published PRICE data for 1996 are 
converted from USD to USD Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). PRICE data for 1997 are 
not available and are interpolated.8 Unpublished price data for 1999 is obtained directly 
from the OECD. PRICE is deflated using an adjusted CPI index. The CPI (1995 = 1) is 
adjusted to maintain currency relativities by multiplying the annual CPI index by 1996 
USD PPP. The CPI is converted into USD by dividing country adjusted CPI by  
the nominal exchange rate. New hosts (∆HOST = HOSTt – HOSTt–1) are obtained by  
first-differencing HOST series. WAGE is the proportion of Compensation of Employees 
(OECD code: WSSS) in nominal GDP.9 
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Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for HOST, ∆HOST, 
PRICE and WAGE are reported in Table 1. Host numbers (HOST) range in value  
from less than four thousand (Luxembourg) to in excess of 80 million (US). The mean 
addition to the HOST count (∆HOST), across both countries and time, is almost 800 000. 
Eleven countries recorded declines in host numbers, with the largest decline in France 
(2000).10 PRICE, the listed price of dominant ISP and PSTN carriers, ranges in  
value from USD18.96 (US) to USD291.43 (Mexico). Average WAGE compensation is 
48% of GDP and reflects considerable variation across the sample from 26% (Turkey) to 
61% (Switzerland). 
Table 1 Summary statistics 1996–2000 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Complete sample 
 HOSTS 2 043 942 9 130 292 3518 80 566 944 
 ∆HOSTS 737 982 3 397 557 –110 664 27 390 988 
 PRICE 53.05 33.73 18.96 291.43 
 WAGE 0.48 0.08 0.26 0.61 
Sample with Mexico and Turkey excluded 
 HOSTS 2 209 516 9 504 014 3518 80 566 944 
 ∆HOSTS 796 852 3 537 170 –110 664 27 390 988 
 PRICE 48.41 20.36 18.96 135.69 
 WAGE 0.50 0.06 0.32 0.61 
Notes: HOST is host numbers. ∆HOST = HOSTt – HOSTt–1. PRICE is the real price of 
internet access in USD purchasing power parity. 
4 Model estimation 
4.1 Functional form specification 
The network growth equation was derived in Section 2 in continuous time as Equation 
(27) to Equation (29). Converting to discrete time, let dt = 1, dn = nt – nt–1 = ∆nt and dzq = 
εq ~ N(0,1). The estimating form becomes: 
( ) [ ] /(1 )/ 1 /(1 ) 11
1 2
1 1 1
1 1
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
/(1 )
11
1 1
1 1 1
 (1 ) (1 )
2 1 1 1 1
(
 
t tt t
t t t t
t t
t t t t
q
w nn n
n n n p
n n
n n n n
w
β αα α α α
α α
α δθ θ
θ θ θ θ
µ α
−− − −
−−
− − −
− −
− − − −
−
⎧ ⎫ + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∆ ⎪ ⎪= +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪+ + + + +⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ + + +⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭
−× [ ]
/(1 )/(1 ) 2
1
,2
1 )t t
n t
t q
n
p
β αα α
εσ
−− −
−+ +
 (30) 
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with error term: 
/(1 ) /(1 ) /(1 )
11
, 1 2 ,
1 1
[1 ]1
1 1
q t tt
n t q t
t t t q
w nn
n n p
α α α α β αµ αε θ θ εσ
− − − −
−−
− −
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫ − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪= + ⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭ ⎣ ⎦
 (31) 
It will prove useful to identify the components of Equation (30) that have direct economic 
interpretation. They are, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution: 
1
1 2
1 1
1
,
1 1
t
t t
n
IES h
n n
θ θ −
− −
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪= = +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 (32) 
the ‘interest rate’ (or rate of return to the network as a productive resource), r: 
/(1 ) /(1 ) /(1 )
1[1 ]t tr w n
α α α α β αα − − − −−= +  (33) 
and the Relative Risk Premium (RRP), defined as the normalised equity premium,  
(µq – r)/σ relative to network access price, p: 
/ .q
q
r
RRP p
µ
σ
⎡ ⎤−= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (34) 
Potential heteroscedasticity is implied by Equation (31). The scale factor attached to the 
random error εq,t in (31) may be summarised, in view of Equation (32) and Equation (34), 
as IES × RRP. This scale factor is itself a stochastic process and contains error variation 
that is partly predetermined (due to nt–1) and partly currently determined (due to wt and 
pt). In addition, wt and pt contain partly systematic variation (since they have drifts µw and 
µp) and partly random variation (in view of their specification as stochastic processes, 
i.e., Equation (18) and Equation (19)). While a weighted correction procedure could be 
applied if all variation were predetermined or systematic, the idea of giving observations 
different weights because of random variation is problematic since it could induce 
inconsistency. An alternative approach is to note that the offending term in Equation (31), 
viz., h(µq –r)/(pσq) has a drift that, though complicated, may be derived from the 
underlying stochastic processes for n, p and w by application of Ito’s Lemma. Borrowing 
methodology from finance theory, there exist synthetic probabilities which would force 
this complex drift to zero, so that the offending scale factor in Equation (31), while not a 
constant, could at least be modelled as a martingale under the synthetic probability 
measure. Here it is proposed to find maximum likelihood estimates for this case. This 
seems more acceptable than attempting to convert the scale factor to a constant when it 
contains random variation. 
To employ the proposed correction procedure, a variable parameter specification  
for components of r, h, µq and σq where they appear in Equation (30) is utilised. This may  
be interpreted as indirectly estimating probabilities associated with realisations of  
IES × RRP. The variable parameter estimation is conducted jointly with estimation of the 
economic parameters of interest in Equation (30), using a maximum likelihood estimator 
that treats the variance of the error in Equation (30) as a constant. This procedure  
allows the maximum likelihood estimation technique to choose parameter values most 
compatible with a variance whose expected value is constant. In particular, the variable 
parameter specification allows for both country-specific and time-specific adjustment 
factors that augment Equation (30) to provide: 
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[ ] /(1 )/(1 ) 11
1, 2
1 1 1
1 1
1, 2 1, 2
1 1 1 1
11
1 1
1 1 1
 (1 ) (1 )
2 1 1 1 1
(
 
c t t tt t
t
t t t t
t t
t t
t t t t
t c t
A T w nn n
n n n p
n n
n n n n
A T w
β αα α δθ θ
θ θ θ θ
µ
−− −
−−
− − −
− −
− − − −
⎧ ⎫ + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∆ ⎪ ⎪= +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪+ + + + +⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ + + +⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭
−× [ ] /(1 )/(1 ) 21
2
1 )t t
t
t t
n
p
β αα α
εσ
−− −
−+ +
 (35) 
where it is now assumed, as part of a method which employs a variable parameter 
specification to choose parameter estimates and indirectly generate probabilities for 
realisations of IES × RRP most compatible with this assumption, that 2 (0, ).t IID N εε σ∼  
Other adjustments to Equation (30), contained in Equation (35), include subsuming 
the constant parameter function αα/(1–α) into the production function ‘intercept’ term A. 
The adjusted intercept is specified as the product of: 
23
1
0
j j
j
c d
c aA eα α =
∑= +  (36) 
and 
2 2( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
0/(1 )
b c b ct t t t
t aT e e
τ τ τ ττ τ− + − − + −= + +  (37) 
where the cj and dj are country parameters and indicator variables (j = 1,…,23), 
respectively. After a grid search, αa and α0 are pre-set at αa = 0.1 and α0 = 0.01, and τa 
and τ0 are pre-set at τa = 0.01 and τ0 = 19. The remaining parameters, cj in the case of the 
country scale factor Ac, and τb and τc in the case of the time scale factor Tt, are freely 
estimated in the non-linear maximum likelihood estimation routine. 
Further, θ1, µq and σq are specified as time varying, and are denoted by θ1,t, µt and σt, 
respectively, as: 
1 1
1, 0
1
,
c US
t t
t c US
t
n n
n
θ θ θ − −
−
⎡ ⎤−= + ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (38) 
2 2( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
0/(1 )
b c b ct t t t
t a e e
µ µ µ µµ µ µ− + − − + −= + +  (39) 
and 
2 2( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
0/(1 ).
b c b ct t t t
t a e e
σ σ σ σσ σ σ− + − − + −= + +  (40) 
Following a grid search, parameter settings µa = 0.01, µ0 = 4, σa = 0.05 and σ0 = 29, are 
imposed. Remaining parameters (θ 0, θ c, µb, µc, σb and σc) are freely estimated. 
Because of the form of the non-linearity in Equation (35), free estimation of the time 
preference rate δ is problematic. Accordingly, this parameter is set at δ = 0.02 after grid 
search. Additionally, experimentation with different forms of the network externality 
variable (internet host numbers versus an index of cumulative growth) and with different 
measures of the externality (world versus country network) is undertaken to improve 
estimation prospects given the non-linear specification. This experimentation led to  
an index approach, and to different preferred network externality measures for the 
consumption and production externalities. The resultant preferred specification is: 
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1
0.02 1
[1 ]
2
t t
t t t t t
t t
n r
IES IES IES RRP
n p
ε
−
∆ −= + + +  (41) 
where IESt, RRPt, and rt are respectively: 
1 1 1
0 2
1 1 1
0.51
,
1 0.5 1 0.5
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t t t
t c US W W
t t t
n n n
IES
n n n
θ θ θ− − −
− − −
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−⎪ ⎪= + +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 (42) 
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 (43) 
and 
23
2
1
2
( 1) ( 1)
/(1 )
( 1) ( 1)
/(1 ) /(1 )
1 1
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1 19
 [1 ] [1 (1 )] .
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τ τ
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− + −
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− −
⎡ ⎤∑ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦× + + −
 (44) 
Network measures are constructed from internet host numbers by applying the rule: 
1 0
1
0
,
c c
c t
t c
HOST HOST
n
HOST
−
−
−=  
where t = 1,…,5, c = 1,…,23, with 0 denoting year 1995. 
4.2 Variable coefficient commentary 
Before proceeding, an interpretation for the variable parameter specifications is provided. 
By construction, 1 0
c
tn − =  for t = 1. At t = 1 the interest rate applicable to holding network 
stock is: 
23
1 /(1 )
1 10.1 0.01 0.06
j j
j
c d
r e w α α= − −
⎡ ⎤∑⎢ ⎥= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
and variations in the interest rate cross country in the initial period reflects real wage 
conditions, differences in initial technology and network externality effects, all of which 
are captured by the cj. 
In this specification, the technology parameter Tt takes the value T1 = 0.06 for all 
countries at t = 1, 1996, and acts as a normalising constant. The specification: 
2
2
( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( 1)
0.01
1 19
b c
b c
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e
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   32 R. Cooper and G. Madden    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
allows for non-monotonic behaviour of network stock efficiency in production, with 
common country behaviour determined by the freely estimated parameters τb and τc. 
When τb(t – 1) + τc(t – 1)2 takes a large negative value, Tt will tend to 0.01, the imposed 
lower bound on Tt. In this specification, Tt can rise above its value at T1, but just. The 
upper bound of 0.0626 is imposed by the scaling constant value of τ0 = 19. Based on 
similar reasoning, the remaining constrained non-linear variable parameter functions are 
described below. 
The country-specific effect: 
23
10.1 0.01
j j
j
c d
cA e
=
∑= +  
has a lower bound of 0.1, but no upper bound. An estimated coefficient of –91.381 for 
Greece implies the lower bound is binding. Other countries are not affected. An estimated 
value of cj = 3 suggests a corresponding parameter value of Ac = 0.3. 
The expected return on the risky AS investment is modelled as: 
2
2
( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( 1)
0.01 .
1 4
b c
b c
t t
t t t
e
e
µ µ
µ µµ
− + −
− + −= + +  
This specification forces µ1 = 0.21 but allows µt to vary from 0.01 to 0.26, with values 
dependent on the freely estimated parameters µb and µc. In estimation neither bound  
is binding. 
The volatility of risky AS investment is modelled as: 
2
2
( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( 1)
0.05 .
1 29
b c
b c
t t
t t t
e
e
σ σ
σ σσ
− + −
− + −= + +  
This specification has a lower bound of 0.05 for σt. It also forces an initial value of  
σ1 = 0.083 and has an upper bound of 0.0845. σt is constrained to begin near its upper 
bound. In estimation, σt fell to the lower bound by the latter part of the sample. 
These variable parameter specifications capture the fall in the expected return on the 
AS risky investment mid-sample, making some allowance for the Asian financial crisis 
and world financial conditions more generally. Additionally, from an econometric point 
of view, the accompanying but lesser fall in volatility leads to a reduced, though 
substantial, fall in the RRP, countervailing a substantial rise in the IES and providing 
some support for the approach that treats IES × RRP as a martingale. 
4.3 Maximum likelihood estimates 
Non-linear maximum likelihood estimation of Equation (41) is performed using 
SHAZAM Version 8 (White, 1997). Parameter estimates and asymptotic t-statistics are 
presented in Table 2. The key results concern parameters associated with consumption 
and production network externalities. Consumption externalities are measured through 
the parameters θ0, θc and θ2. The non-US θC is estimated as economically small in  
impact at –0.649.11 For purpose of discussion, treat θ0 = θ1. The estimates of θ 1 and θ 2 
suggest the IES is bounded from below by 3.321 at the beginning of the sample period 
and from above by 16.657 as world network grows indefinitely large. The difference 
between the lower and upper bounds indicates the importance of the network externality 
in consumption. 
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Table 2 Estimation results 
Parameter Estimate t-Ratio 
θ0 3.321 3.608 
θC –0.649 –0.699 
θ2 16.657 2.675 
α 0.584 10.807 
βw 0.334 2.797 
βc 0.461 3.185 
Australia 4.111 19.468 
Austria 3.278 37.295 
Belgium 1.987 5.427 
Canada 3.890 26.161 
Denmark 3.153 24.884 
Finland 4.423 16.316 
France 2.918 18.213 
Germany 4.023 27.406 
Greece –91.381 –2.756 
Iceland 4.217 25.194 
Ireland 2.725 14.496 
Italy 2.837 17.357 
Japan 2.932 16.488 
Luxembourg 3.278 26.042 
The Netherlands 3.150 28.019 
NZ 3.159 17.232 
Norway 3.373 21.993 
Portugal 2.683 15.568 
Spain 2.463 11.018 
Sweden 4.253 28.521 
Switzerland 4.310 30.717 
UK 3.965 30.520 
USA 3.809 8.639 
τB –6.169 –7.179 
τC 1.258 5.771 
µB –2.215 –9.306 
µC 0.464 6.449 
σB 2.324 0.084 
σC –2.294 –0.171 
R2 statistic 0.716  
L 18.489  
Notes: R2 is the squared correlation coefficient between observed and predicted 
values. L is the log of the likelihood. t-Ratio is asymptotic. 
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Turning to the evidence concerning production externalities, the crucial parameters are βw 
for externalities related to the size of the world network estimated at 0.334 and, βc for 
externalities related to the size of specific country networks and estimated at 0.461.12 The 
results imply effective increasing returns to scale due to the externality of 1.334 for the 
US (with the world network size providing the externality) and 1.461 for other countries 
(with the size of the country-specific stock providing the externality). 
An ancillary production function parameter is α. Estimated at 0.584, this indicates the 
variable factor input share of output income is 58%. Remaining parameter estimates 
control for country-specific effects in technology, the extent of externalities prior to 1996, 
for variation in the normalised risk premium and the returns to AS investment over time. 
Generally, these results indicate the importance of allowing for these variations in the 
pooled data set. 
Table 3 reports variable parameter estimates and other functions that vary  
cross-country or time. Column (3) and Column (4) labelled AC and T, respectively, 
provide estimates of the country-specific component and time-specific component that 
together define the scale factor for the interest rate, viz., ACTt in the expression for rt: 
/(1 ) /(1 )/(1 )
1 1[1 ] [1 (1 )] .
W cW c
t C t t t USA t USAr A T w n d n d
β α β αα α − −− −
− −= + + −  (45) 
The interest rate, constructed according to Equation (45), is given in Column (7) of Table 
3. Column (5) and Column (6) report the remaining variable parameter components of the 
normalised risk premium, viz., σ and µ. Comparison of Column (6) and Column (7) 
shows the risk premium is positive for most countries and time periods, with negative 
values reported for seven countries, and all in the final time period. Preliminary grid 
searches for economically sensible values of parameters controlling upper and lower 
limits on the allowable variation in estimates of Tt, µt and σt, and a lower limit for AC  
are based on minimising the number of violations of non-positive risk premiums.  
Given these pre-set values, maximum likelihood estimation proceeded on the basis of 
generation of a minimal number of these economically problematic results. Column (8) 
reports the calculated IES values. In particular, the IES is rising through time to near its 
upper bound, implying that benefits from increased network size will be lower on further 
network expansion. 
The presence of a country-specific effect leads to some minor variation across 
countries in the size of the IES. An interesting result is the rise in the IES through time. 
This rise is significant, as indicated by a likelihood ratio test on the difference in the 
underlying parameters controlling the variability in the IES, and is directly attributable to 
world network externalities in consumption. As a further aid to economic interpretation, 
Column (9) translates the estimated IES value to the implied value of γ in the utility 
function. Over the sample period, the power rises from approximately 0.75 in 1996 to 
0.93 in 2000. Based on an estimated value of 16.657 for θ 2, which is the estimated 
asymptotic limit for the IES, the γ in the utility function will asymptote to 0.94 as 
network size increases indefinitely. This suggests that the long-run optimal degree of 
consumption externality has almost been exhausted. That is, further network growth will 
not increase the consumption externality appreciably. 
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Table 3 Variable parameter estimates 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Country Year AC T σ µ r IES γ 
Australia 1996 0.710 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.119 3.938 0.746 
Australia 1997 0.710 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.057 7.280 0.863 
Australia 1998 0.710 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.048 10.571 0.905 
Australia 1999 0.710 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.060 12.112 0.917 
Australia 2000 0.710 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.152 13.700 0.927 
Austria 1996 0.365 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.054 3.965 0.748 
Austria 1997 0.365 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.026 7.301 0.863 
Austria 1998 0.365 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.021 10.579 0.905 
Austria 1999 0.365 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.036 12.117 0.917 
Austria 2000 0.365 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.101 13.703 0.927 
Belgium 1996 0.173 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.026 3.967 0.748 
Belgium 1997 0.173 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.017 7.302 0.863 
Belgium 1998 0.173 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.019 10.579 0.905 
Belgium 1999 0.173 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.040 12.117 0.917 
Belgium 2000 0.173 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.121 13.702 0.927 
Canada 1996 0.589 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.090 3.931 0.746 
Canada 1997 0.589 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.042 7.276 0.863 
Canada 1998 0.589 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.038 10.568 0.905 
Canada 1999 0.589 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.055 12.110 0.917 
Canada 2000 0.589 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.152 13.699 0.927 
Denmark 1996 0.334 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.049 3.965 0.748 
Denmark 1997 0.334 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.030 7.300 0.863 
Denmark 1998 0.334 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.032 10.578 0.905 
Denmark 1999 0.334 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.061 12.116 0.917 
Denmark 2000 0.334 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.127 13.702 0.927 
Finland 1996 0.933 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.148 3.948 0.747 
Finland 1997 0.933 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.064 7.290 0.863 
Finland 1998 0.933 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.068 10.574 0.905 
Finland 1999 0.933 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.064 12.115 0.917 
Finland 2000 0.933 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.120 13.702 0.927 
France 1996 0.285 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.043 3.954 0.747 
France 1997 0.285 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.019 7.294 0.863 
France 1998 0.285 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.020 10.576 0.905 
France 1999 0.285 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.030 12.114 0.917 
France 2000 0.285 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.136 13.700 0.927 
Germany 1996 0.659 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.090 3.920 0.745 
Germany 1997 0.659 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.039 7.272 0.862 
Germany 1998 0.659 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.045 10.564 0.905 
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Table 3 Variable parameter estimates (continued) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Country Year AC T σ µ r IES γ 
Germany 1999 0.659 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.059 12.107 0.917 
Germany 2000 0.659 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.118 13.699 0.927 
Greece 1996 0.100 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.030 3.970 0.748 
Greece 1997 0.100 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.018 7.304 0.863 
Greece 1998 0.100 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.020 10.581 0.905 
Greece 1999 0.100 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.038 12.118 0.917 
Greece 2000 0.100 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.105 13.703 0.927 
Iceland 1996 0.778 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.120 3.970 0.748 
Iceland 1997 0.778 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.049 7.304 0.863 
Iceland 1998 0.778 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.050 10.581 0.905 
Iceland 1999 0.778 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.069 12.118 0.917 
Iceland 2000 0.778 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.145 13.703 0.927 
Ireland 1996 0.253 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.047 3.969 0.748 
Ireland 1997 0.253 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.030 7.304 0.863 
Ireland 1998 0.253 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.032 10.580 0.905 
Ireland 1999 0.253 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.046 12.118 0.917 
Ireland 2000 0.253 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.099 13.703 0.927 
Italy 1996 0.271 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.054 3.963 0.748 
Italy 1997 0.271 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.031 7.298 0.863 
Italy 1998 0.271 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.039 10.577 0.905 
Italy 1999 0.271 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.062 12.115 0.917 
Italy 2000 0.271 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.084 13.703 0.927 
Japan 1996 0.288 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.040 3.942 0.746 
Japan 1997 0.288 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.033 7.270 0.862 
Japan 1998 0.288 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.035 10.563 0.905 
Japan 1999 0.288 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.053 12.106 0.917 
Japan 2000 0.288 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.152 13.696 0.927 
Luxembourg 1996 0.365 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.053 3.970 0.748 
Luxembourg 1997 0.365 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.031 7.305 0.863 
Luxembourg 1998 0.365 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.028 10.581 0.905 
Luxembourg 1999 0.365 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.050 12.118 0.917 
Luxembourg 2000 0.365 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.114 13.703 0.927 
The Netherlands 1996 0.333 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.048 3.952 0.747 
The Netherlands 1997 0.333 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.022 7.292 0.863 
The Netherlands 1998 0.333 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.022 10.575 0.905 
The Netherlands 1999 0.333 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.038 12.114 0.917 
The Netherlands 2000 0.333 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.107 13.701 0.927 
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Table 3 Variable parameter estimates (continued) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Country Year AC T σ µ r IES γ 
NZ 1996 0.336 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.064 3.965 0.748 
NZ 1997 0.336 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.029 7.301 0.863 
NZ 1998 0.336 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.041 10.578 0.905 
NZ 1999 0.336 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.032 12.117 0.917 
NZ 2000 0.336 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.119 13.703 0.927 
Norway 1996 0.392 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.070 3.962 0.748 
Norway 1997 0.392 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.035 7.298 0.863 
Norway 1998 0.392 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.044 10.577 0.905 
Norway 1999 0.392 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.049 12.116 0.917 
Norway 2000 0.392 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.143 13.702 0.927 
Portugal 1996 0.246 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.048 3.969 0.748 
Portugal 1997 0.246 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.028 7.304 0.863 
Portugal 1998 0.246 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.034 10.580 0.905 
Portugal 1999 0.246 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.049 12.118 0.917 
Portugal 2000 0.246 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.121 13.703 0.927 
Spain 1996 0.217 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.032 3.965 0.748 
Spain 1997 0.217 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.023 7.299 0.863 
Spain 1998 0.217 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.027 10.578 0.905 
Spain 1999 0.217 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.044 12.116 0.917 
Spain 2000 0.217 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.123 13.702 0.927 
Sweden 1996 0.803 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.101 3.955 0.747 
Sweden 1997 0.803 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.051 7.294 0.863 
Sweden 1998 0.803 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.051 10.576 0.905 
Sweden 1999 0.803 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.056 12.115 0.917 
Sweden 2000 0.803 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.141 13.702 0.927 
Switzerland 1996 0.845 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.103 3.962 0.748 
Switzerland 1997 0.845 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.049 7.299 0.863 
Switzerland 1998 0.845 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.047 10.578 0.905 
Switzerland 1999 0.845 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.064 12.117 0.917 
Switzerland 2000 0.845 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.127 13.703 0.927 
UK 1996 0.627 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.090 3.924 0.745 
UK 1997 0.627 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.043 7.271 0.862 
UK 1998 0.627 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.039 10.566 0.905 
UK 1999 0.627 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.058 12.107 0.917 
UK 2000 0.627 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.123 13.698 0.927 
USA 1996 0.551 0.060 0.083 0.210 0.072 3.321 0.699 
USA 1997 0.551 0.016 0.083 0.112 0.031 6.826 0.854 
USA 1998 0.551 0.011 0.058 0.068 0.033 10.270 0.903 
USA 1999 0.551 0.011 0.050 0.073 0.044 11.886 0.916 
USA 2000 0.551 0.019 0.050 0.132 0.117 13.552 0.926 
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5 Conclusion 
A driving force behind the emergence of the new or information economy is the growth 
of internet network capacity. However, a fundamental problem in mapping this dynamic 
is the lack of an acceptable theoretical framework through which to direct empirical 
investigation of internet network host evolution. Most of the models in the literature  
on network externalities have been developed in a static framework, with externalities 
viewed as instantaneous or self-fulfilling. They also only consider consumption 
externalities. The model specified here builds on received theory from several sources  
to include these features, and develops a model that is both capable of econometric 
estimation and which provides as an output a direct measure of the network effect. 
Accordingly, a goal of this paper is to find the magnitude of the externality effect on 
internet network growth. In addition, the paper illustrates how panel data can generate 
estimates of structural parameters capable of explaining internet host growth. 
Estimates of an endogenous growth model in which sustained internet system growth 
are the result of consumption and production externalities are presented. Estimation on a 
sample of OECD Member States shows model results are compatible with internet host 
growth data. To summarise, both production and consumption externalities are strongly 
in evident in model estimates. Production externalities although modelled reasonably 
simply, indicate substantial increasing returns to scale. On the consumption side, the 
possibility of the externality varying with network size is also examined. Over the 
estimation period, the consumption externality has strengthened and appears close to its 
maximum. This finding suggests that future internet growth will most likely be due to 
production-related externalities. 
Several issues are raised as a result of this investigation. In particular, with 
consumption-side evidence suggesting its future effect will be relatively minor, closer 
attention needs to be paid to the production-side specification. This specification treats 
the production externality as a scale effect for a modified linearly homogeneous 
production function. A task remains to consider both effects in a more general setting, so 
as to allow examination of ultimate optimal network size. Finally, the model suggests that 
the traditional notion of critical mass needs to be modified, in the context of the internet, 
so as to allow for both local and global critical mass. 
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Notes 
1 Rohlfs (1974), Littlechild (1975) and Oren and Smith (1981) analyse network externalities in 
the context of a monopoly telecommunications network. 
2 The field around the unstable critical mass point is ‘critical’ in the sense that smaller 
fluctuations can have a large effect upon the continued development of diffusion (Schoder, 
2000). Industries with network externalities typically exhibit a positive critical mass, that  
is, small networks are not observed at any price (Economides and Himmelberg, 1995). The 
critical mass point can also be interpreted as the turning point between positive and negative 
returns to diffusion (Markus, 1990). 
3 The ‘micro’ approach is more concerned with the actual configuration of the network so as to 
better understand the origin of any externalities (Economides, 1996). 
4 In a more general formulation, if the equity investment is in new economy stocks, then the 
drift and volatility might be modelled as functions of the network size, leading potentially to 
another source of network externalities. 
5 Since the externality is irrelevant to the private optimiser, the problem is formally equivalent 
to a stochastic inter-temporal optimisation of the type described by Cooper et al. (1995).  
6 The 23 countries are comprised of: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the USA. Mexico and 
Turkey are not included as they are outliers. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and South 
Korea are excluded because of insufficient internet access price data. 
7 Complete GDP data are not available for Ireland (2000) and New Zealand (1999, 2000) in the 
ITU database and are obtained directly from the Central Statistics Office (Ireland) and 
Statistics New Zealand. 
8 A geometric procedure based on the rule 
1
2
1998
1997 1996
1996
PRICE
PRICE PRICE
PRICE
⎛ ⎞= × ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
is used to 
interpolate the PRICE series. 
9 Compensation of Employees is obtained directly from the OECD. 
10 The countries with declines in new hosts are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. 
11 Although the parameter shows up as insignificant according to the asymptotic t-statistic,  
a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test rejects the restriction that θC = 0 (LR=24.960, critical 
2
1 (.01) 6.63).χ =  Therefore, the results with θC freely estimated are reported. From an 
economic perspective, however, the country-specific effect is undoubtedly minor. 
12 The world stock network externality is related to US hosts but not other country hosts, while 
the reverse is true for the country network size externality, which is relevant for countries 
other than the USA. At this point the significance of these effects is simply noted. A LR test of 
the joint null hypothesis βw = 0, βc = 0 rejects the null 22(LR = 97.688, critical (.01) 9.21).χ =  
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Appendix 
Table 1 Source and constructed data 
Country Year Price Wage HOSTS ∆HOSTS HOSTS–1 
Australia 1996  22.09 0.4801     514,760    205,198    309,562 
Australia 1997  33.53 0.4859     665,403    150,643    514,760 
Australia 1998  43.76 0.4916     792,351    126,948    665,403 
Australia 1999  43.39 0.4810   1,090,468    298,117    792,351 
Australia 2000  43.42 0.4787   1,615,939    525,471  1,090,468 
Austria 1996  55.40 0.5281      88,811     35,467     53,344 
Austria 1997  75.43 0.5215     108,473     19,662     88,811 
Austria 1998  83.10 0.5230     172,569     64,096    108,473 
Austria 1999  73.41 0.5229     262,632     90,063    172,569 
Austria 2000  46.10 0.5178     483,208    220,576    262,632 
Belgium 1996  46.81 0.5169      65,064     34,443     30,621 
Belgium 1997  70.85 0.5119     106,808     41,744     65,064 
Belgium 1998  87.60 0.5099     208,665    101,857    106,808 
Belgium 1999  80.53 0.5110     339,357    130,692    208,665 
Belgium 2000  56.90 0.5095     300,193    –39,164    339,357 
Canada 1996  26.47 0.5142     603,325    230,434    372,891 
Canada 1997  31.18 0.5185     839,141    235,816    603,325 
Canada 1998  38.14 0.5262   1,119,172    280,031    839,141 
Canada 1999  35.89 0.5115   1,669,664    550,492  1,119,172 
Canada 2000  40.73 0.5062   2,364,014    694,350  1,669,664 
Denmark 1996  35.20 0.5326     106,732     56,175     50,557 
Denmark 1997  40.95 0.5334     169,368     62,636    106,732 
Denmark 1998  38.94 0.5379     298,275    128,907    169,368 
Denmark 1999  42.92 0.5399     338,239     39,964    298,275 
Denmark 2000  25.87 0.5258     333,978     –4,261    338,239 
Finland 1996  23.16 0.4996     314,141     98,437    215,704 
Finland 1997  26.19 0.4864     486,811    172,670    314,141 
Finland 1998  23.76 0.4841     459,568    –27,243    486,811 
Finland 1999  29.38 0.4855     461,760      2,192    459,568 
Finland 2000  30.43 0.4631     529,261     67,501    461,760 
France 1996  31.72 0.5213     236,874     85,701    151,173 
France 1997  47.72 0.5193     355,031    118,157    236,874 
France 1998  59.30 0.5184     511,193    156,162    355,031 
France 1999  54.75 0.5209   1,233,071    721,878    511,193 
France 2000  34.44 0.5243   1,122,407   –110,664  1,233,071 
Germany 1996  41.54 0.5559     691,864    217,489    474,375 
Germany 1997  52.43 0.5417   1,132,174    440,310    691,864 
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Table 1 Source and constructed data (continued) 
Country Year Price Wage HOSTS ∆HOSTS HOSTS–1 
Germany 1998  53.98 0.5321   1,449,915    317,741  1,132,174 
Germany 1999  40.07 0.5328   1,635,067    185,152  1,449,915 
Germany 2000  33.48 0.5343   2,040,437    405,370  1,635,067 
Greece 1996  70.00 0.3207      16,738      8,997      7,741 
Greece 1997  72.67 0.3299      28,131     11,393     16,738 
Greece 1998  66.42 0.3420      49,904     21,773     28,131 
Greece 1999  81.77 0.3411      75,088     25,184     49,904 
Greece 2000  54.61 0.3427     110,608     35,520     75,088 
Iceland 1996  24.52 0.5113      11,542      3,232      8,310 
Iceland 1997  31.37 0.5015      18,520      6,978     11,542 
Iceland 1998  35.72 0.5207      24,794      6,274     18,520 
Iceland 1999  35.93 0.5288      29,872      5,078     24,794 
Iceland 2000  28.62 0.5367      39,901     10,029     29,872 
Ireland 1996  73.34 0.4474      26,895     13,460     13,435 
Ireland 1997  82.27 0.4275      39,864     12,969     26,895 
Ireland 1998  75.85 0.4039      55,859     15,995     39,864 
Ireland 1999  64.92 0.4098      63,913      8,054     55,859 
Ireland 2000  61.00 0.3938     110,545     46,632     63,913 
Italy 1996  48.85 0.4252     147,873     72,497     75,376 
Italy 1997  49.36 0.4273     254,296    106,423    147,873 
Italy 1998  40.81 0.4091     386,632    132,336    254,296 
Italy 1999  43.53 0.4119     301,528    –85,104    386,632 
Italy 2000  38.06 0.4043   1,019,711    718,183    301,528 
Japan 1996  22.90 0.5536     734,406    465,079    269,327 
Japan 1997  31.68 0.5583   1,168,956    434,550    734,406 
Japan 1998  35.17 0.5653   1,687,534    518,578  1,168,956 
Japan 1999  24.25 0.5598   2,636,541    949,007  1,687,534 
Japan 2000  22.87 0.5640   4,640,863  2,004,322  2,636,541 
Luxembourg 1996  38.64 0.5317       3,518      1,638      1,880 
Luxembourg 1997  53.91 0.5117       4,743      1,225      3,518 
Luxembourg 1998  61.29 0.5067       7,737      2,994      4,743 
Luxembourg 1999  84.24 0.5005       9,614      1,877      7,737 
Luxembourg 2000  59.93 0.4920      11,814      2,200      9,614 
The Netherlands 1996  45.16 0.5350     270,511     98,746    171,765 
The Netherlands 1997  55.06 0.5315     391,228    120,717    270,511 
The Netherlands 1998  54.45 0.5306     625,769    234,541    391,228 
The Netherlands 1999  48.07 0.5169     959,083    333,314    625,769 
The Netherlands 2000  52.90 0.5167   1,623,567    664,484    959,083 
NZ 1996  55.41 0.4368      84,532     30,922     53,610 
NZ 1997  58.55 0.4398     169,264     84,732     84,532 
NZ 1998  56.61 0.4390     137,247    –32,017    169,264 
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Table 1 Source and constructed data (continued) 
Country Year Price Wage HOSTS ∆HOSTS HOSTS–1 
NZ 1999  50.32 0.4441     271,003    133,756    137,247 
NZ 2000  53.62 0.4430     345,107     74,104    271,003 
Norway 1996  27.16 0.4596     150,130     65,836     84,294 
Norway 1997  34.04 0.4678     292,382    142,252    150,130 
Norway 1998  39.19 0.5017     318,993     26,611    292,382 
Norway 1999  37.93 0.4964     438,961    119,968    318,993 
Norway 2000  39.07 0.4444     452,677     13,716    438,961 
Portugal 1996 135.69 0.4290      23,482     11,706     11,776 
Portugal 1997 116.40 0.4313      42,447     18,965     23,482 
Portugal 1998  79.35 0.4397      55,746     13,299     42,447 
Portugal 1999 108.09 0.4279      77,761     22,015     55,746 
Portugal 2000  74.05 0.4347      62,147    –15,614     77,761 
Spain 1996  53.54 0.5225     113,227     61,771     51,456 
Spain 1997  54.46 0.4980     196,403     83,176    113,227 
Spain 1998  45.13 0.5003     306,559    110,156    196,403 
Spain 1999  58.56 0.5026     469,587    163,028    306,559 
Spain 2000  58.62 0.5061     455,487    –14,100    469,587 
Sweden 1996  22.65 0.5895     237,832     92,988    144,844 
Sweden 1997  31.59 0.5631     348,609    110,777    237,832 
Sweden 1998  39.64 0.5648     379,455     30,846    348,609 
Sweden 1999  33.76 0.5613     522,888    143,433    379,455 
Sweden 2000  33.56 0.5612     595,698     72,810    522,888 
Switzerland 1996  29.22 0.6034     132,925     52,791     80,134 
Switzerland 1997  38.35 0.6063     189,175     56,250    132,925 
Switzerland 1998  44.13 0.6074     245,409     56,234    189,175 
Switzerland 1999  41.34 0.6044     269,812     24,403    245,409 
Switzerland 2000  29.58 0.5942     262,510     –7,302    269,812 
UK 1996  57.71 0.5351     719,333    279,565    439,768 
UK 1997  59.96 0.5369     987,733    268,400    719,333 
UK 1998  60.07 0.5437   1,449,315    461,582    987,733 
UK 1999  52.87 0.5524   1,739,078    289,763  1,449,315 
UK 2000  36.79 0.5577   1,677,946    –61,132  1,739,078 
USA 1996  28.06 0.5756  10,112,888  4,057,929  6,054,959 
USA 1997  32.17 0.5603  20,623,996 10,511,108 10,112,888 
USA 1998  37.18 0.5689  30,489,464  9,865,468 20,623,996 
USA 1999  32.18 0.5699  53,175,956 22,686,492 30,489,464 
USA 2000  18.96 0.5659  80,566,944 27,390,988 53,175,956 
World 1996    16,249,917  9,485,918 
World 1997    30,127,576  16,249,917 
World 1998    43,547,090  30,127,576 
World 1999    72,010,326  43,547,090 
World 2000   106,724,179  72,010,326 
 
